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Can prominent anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny endanger Vladimir Putin’s long-standing rule?
In light of the recent protests in Moscow, Alexander Titov traces the history of anti-Putin protests
since the 2011 swapping of roles between Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. He argues that the timing is
just right for a new protest movement to gather momentum ahead of the March 2018 presidential
election, but a question mark remains over whether Navalny’s appeal can spread beyond the
relatively narrow anti-regime electorate.
Alexei Navalny. Credits: Alexey Yushenkov / Алексей Юшенков (CC BY SA 3.0)
It looks like Russia’s protest politics are waking up after a long sleep. In the last three months, Russia has
witnessed two nation-wide protests, with hundreds arrested by the riot police. At the centre of the protest is Alexei
Navalny, a charismatic opposition leader who built his reputation on anti-corruption revelations, often taking aim at
the highest members of Russia’s political elite such as the Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.
Navalny’s first aim is to force a political crisis, at the minimum creating enough popular pressure on authorities to
include his name on the ballot box in next year’s presidential elections (he is currently banned from standing due to
a criminal sentence, widely seen as politically motivated). His ultimate aim is to topple Putin’s regime through mass
protests similar to the Maidan revolution in Kyiv in 2014. For that to happen, Navalny would  need much larger
numbers on the streets of Moscow, something similar to the demonstrations in the early 1990s that gathered up to
500,000 protesters.
Whether there is potential for such large scale protests will depend to a great degree on the economy. Russia has
never regained a high rate of growth since the 2008 financial crisis, and in 2014 the country went into outright
recession under the double weight of western sanctions and collapsing oil prices. Although the Russian economy is
turning the corner from a recession and entering lacklustre growth, living standards will remain well below their pre-
crisis peak for the foreseeable future.
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Navalny’s advantage
Navalny’s signature topic – corruption – is particularly appealing at a time of economic distress for the majority of the
population. A film Navalny has created on Medvedev’s alleged corrupt activities has gained almost 23 million views.
It even prompted a high level response from one of Russia’s richest individuals, Alisher Usmanov (and one of the
owners of Arsenal FC), in the form of a YouTube blog. Although Navalny appeared a bit shaky in this exchange,
particularly by focusing on allegations of rape against Usmanov – which he couldn’t prove, and which also led to him
misrepresenting the book where he claimed it was alleged – the overall impression is that the powers that be have
been rattled by Navalny.
The authorities tried to re-capture the corruption topic, and Russia saw a string of high profile arrests of regional
governors and even a Minister of Economic Development, Alexei Ulyukayev, for accepting a bribe (although some
claim this had more to do with power struggles inside Putin’s government, in particular the strengthening of Putin’s
powerful ally Igor Sechin of oil giant Rosneft, in whose offices Ulyukaev was arrested). But Navalny’s campaign
against Medvedev (and before that the Procurator General Chaika), undoubtedly had more of an impact among the
politically active population.
History of protest and reaction
Navalny is a familiar figure to those following Russian politics over the last decade, and is often touted as the only
man capable of toppling Putin’s regime. He ran a very successful campaign in 2011 against the United Russia ruling
party, dubbing it a ‘party of thieves and crooks’, which tapped into popular frustration built up at the end of the
Medvedev presidency, exemplified by the announcement of the swapping of roles between Medvedev and Putin at
United Russia’s congress in September 2011. Following widespread accusations of electoral fraud, Russia was
rocked by mass protests at a level unseen since the 1990s.
An anti-Putin rally in Moscow on 24 December 2011. Credits: Bogomolov PL (CC BY-SA 3.0)
These protests petered out, however, through a combination of repression, the mobilisation of regime support by the
new head of internal politics Vyacheslav Volodin, the lack of a clear agenda and chronic squabbling among the
opposition. Some experiments with competitive elections were allowed, such as the 2013 Moscow mayoral
elections where Navalny was allowed to run, scoring a very respectable 27% of votes, although from an
exceptionally low turnout of 32%. This showed both his strength as an effective campaigner able to draw on a core
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of committed activists, while at the same time leaving a question mark over how far Navalny’s appeal could spread
beyond the relatively narrow anti-regime electorate.
By 2014, the political picture was changed again by the annexation of Crimea and an unprecedented (for post-
Soviet Russia) standoff with the West over Ukraine, and later Syria. As a result, last year’s parliamentary elections
in Russia were a complete contrast to 2011. In 2016, they were dull and uneventful, marked by the collapse of
electoral support for the liberal opposition parties (the veteran liberal Yabloko party got just under 2% of votes, its
lowest ever). This year is, however, different.
Russia is in the presidential election cycle now, so the timing is just right for a protest movement to gather
momentum before the March 2018 election date (which was deliberately put by the authorities to coincide with the
anniversary of the annexation of Crimea in 2014). Putin still lacks a clear slogan for his next six-year-term compared
with the past elections.
The main theme for his first term was restoring order by dealing with Chechnya, the second was anti-oligarchic
campaign and the Yukos affair. The changeover with Medvedev came amid an unusually severe anti-West
campaign in 2008/9, while in 2012, it was the re-nationalisation of Russia’s elites and raising living standards for
state employees that was the main theme. What Putin’s next focus will be is unclear, and in the meantime Navalny is
pushing his own agenda of anti-corruption politics and real political change which clearly resonates with some
voters.
Strengths and weaknesses
The events in Moscow on 12 June 2017 illustrated both the strengths and weaknesses of Navalny’s strategy. The
protests planned at Sakharov Avenue were agreed by the city authorities, but on the eve of the demonstration,
Navalny called on his supporters to turned up at the Tverskaya Street, Moscow’s main thoroughfare, where various
activities were planned to commemorate Russia’s independence date.
The authorities tried to put a spanner in Navalny’s works by making it difficult to find sound equipment for the
authorised event, and Navalny retaliated by calling on his supporters to move to Tverskaya instead. This
transformed a previously authorised protest into a direct clash with the police.
Similar events happened in St Petersburg where a crowd of around 10,000 people gathered at a central location
against official warnings not to do so, followed by the arrest of some 561 protesters (most getting fines and/or up to
10 days in custody). Navalny himself was detained before being able to join the protesters and given a 30 day
detention order.
What stands out is Navalny’s country-wide reach. He has employed a successful strategy to couple the general
themes of regime corruption with local issues to galvanise support, such as protests against the transfer of St
Isaac’s Cathedral to the Russian Orthodox Church in St Petersburg, or plans for the demolition of old housing stock
in Moscow, and a hike in utility bills in Novosibirsk . The levels of youth participation are also significant, and
although there’s no detailed studies yet, anecdotal evidence suggest that teenagers are highly active in protests in
Moscow and St Petersburg at least.
Navalny is not without his faults. His opponents, even among the liberal opposition, single him out as arrogant,
domineering, and not prone to compromises or alliances. For example, he refused to support the campaign of
Dmitry Gudkov in a Moscow constituency, which was the only realistic chance of electing an opposition MP at the
last Duma elections.
Yet, Navalny is the most charismatic leader among the opposition, and he is able to get people out into the street to
protest in most Russian cities, though the most numerous protests were in Moscow and St Petersburg. And if the
protest movement continues to grow, which is still uncertain, he will be in a unique position to capitalise on it.
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Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics. 
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